Hunting for Freedom in Modern Life

PART 2:  PSYCHOLOGICAL FREEDOM

By Joseph

In last week’s issue we found a that without the careful control of a strong-willed Self, modernity may plunge the individual into failure in both the public and private spheres.  Therefore, if capitalism and the market are only able to provide the illusion of freedom for the contemporary individual, perhaps we can locate a conception of actual freedom in a psychological exploration of the nature of the Self.  For the philosopher Hannah Arendt, the psychological Self necessarily divides itself into two distinct parts, the I and the Me, for “thinking.”  For Arendt, thinking is internal dialogue occurring within the mind, which necessarily includes tension within the self.  The presence or absence of harmony during this self-split allows for both the creation of morality within the individual, and for freedom.  From the start it is not clear that freedom actually exists during the self-split, for in the same way that the separation of distinct public and private spheres shuts out freedom through disruption of the self, might Arendt’s thinking split also result in a critical loss of integrity?  On the other hand, what happens when we examine an individual who does not have a gap between the I and Me, thus lacking an internal dialogue?  This individual is always firm in his convictions, never wavering, full of self-respect, and utterly boring.  As the author Mark Helprin identified via one of his characters in the novel Winter’s Tale, “It’s the quick turns that mean you’re alive.”3  In short, what often gives us the greatest sense of vitality is not a static self-coherence, but a self that is constantly in flux through both dialogue within itself and by the incorporation and reshaping of external influences.  Arendt also locates this sense of freedom in the split self:  “Much more reliable will be the doubters and skeptics, not because skepticism is good or doubting wholesome, but because they are used to examine things and make up their own minds.”4  Whereas the capacity to examine is Arendt’s way of identifying the type of thinking that is important, the fact that doubters are able to “make up their own minds” illustrates the freedom that they gain from thinking.  Without thinking we become subject not only to a stale morality built of our stolid convictions, we are also unable to take the external influences with which we are constantly bombarded and make them our own.

Image courtesy Miltblog.com

In Arendt’s concept of thinking, they key to the notion of freedom is the self-development that thinking initiates.  Arendt describes thinking as analogous to the story of Penelope:  “thinking is like the veil of Penelope:  it undoes every morning what it had finished the night before.”4  Whereas this process may be viewed as stagnating the development of the self, this view in fact misses the point of the breaking down—only by destroying all previous conceptions can we rebuild a psychological self that is bigger, better, and more free.  The union of the two halves of the self achieves meaning in a moment of vitality, but in order to continue to achieve meaning in further moments of erotic vitality, the self must be unraveled again.  In addition, the memory process strengthens the development of the self--each breakdown does not necessarily mean a loss of ground because in further inner-dialogue the self can draw upon the previous moments of vitality and use them to build yet another moment in which we find ourselves feeling most alive.  In short, meanings are just one example of how thinking gives us the freedom to explore and develop, and as Nietzsche said, “if you have your why for life, you can get by with almost any how.”  Thinking gives us freedom, freedom gives us meaning, and meaning in turn provides the freedom of action that we, as market/capitalists, desire.

Arendt’s thinking is only one function or aspect of the self.  According to John Riker, another modern philosopher, it is not simply thinking but a well-organized and self-object related self that allows for vitality, and with this vitality, freedom.  The only way to achieve complete individual singularity is to construct and know a strong self, for if an individual can be himself to his fullest potential, then he has the freedom to do anything.  So first of all, a strong self must be constructed to contain ideals, ambitions, idiosyncratic traits, and most importantly, self-object relationships.  The first three of these components are easier to understand and come more naturally, so instead I will use the bulk of this analysis to discuss self-object relationships.  In addition, if a self-object relationship is to be understood as the presence of other individuals who can perform self-functions when the self is unable to5, might such dependence on others limit freedom?  The short answer is yes and the long answer is no—for though a self-object relationship may indicate dependence superficially, it is important that not only does this conception of self-psychology entail a new conception of individuality, but also that dependence does not always result in a lack of freedom. 

First of all, in Riker’s conception of self-psychology the self is not physically bound within the body of a particular individual, but incorporates the psyches of others as its self-objects.  Therefore, if the self is conceived of as the representative portion of an individual, then the “boundaries” of an individual will extend beyond his physical limits.  Without the presence of self-objects to carry out self-functions when the self lapses, the individual will fall into psychological abnormalities that will limit his freedom through a restricting pattern of pathological habits.  Given this new notion of the singular person, freedom now must rely upon the restrictions placed upon the entire web of self-objects rather than his particular self.  Second, dependence does not always result in a lack of freedom.  It is only natural that we depend on others for psychological support, and it is modernity that has only recently replaced self-objects with value instead on the autonomy and self-sufficiency of an individual.  Outwardly it might seem that in attempting to reconcile conceptions of freedom with the pressures of modernity this entire analysis praises extreme autonomy in an ultimate bow to the pressures of modernity.  Rather, I am attempting a conceptualization of freedom in contemporary society that does not restrict the vitality and meaning of life.  The self that functions best is that which is coherent and well-organized, and as normal life presents a number of psychological difficulties that are beyond the capacity of a single self to cope, the self-object interaction of others is necessary.  Therefore by fulfilling lacking self-functions, self-objects create a coherent self, and a coherent self has the capacity for truly becoming and is therefore the paramount expression of freedom.  An Aristotelian concept of the Self defines it as the substantive and critically acting “essence” of the object—to take a simple example, the essence of a knife is cutting, in that cutting is the act the knife performs that gives the knife substance.  Although extending this analogy to something as complex as a human is tricky, the point is that for an intricate and conscious being like a human, managing all aspects of a substantive essence (the Self) can be difficult.  In an increasingly complex modern world, we must make crutches out of our peers in order to shore up our increasingly complex and delicately balanced selves.  What truly matters is the depth of the relationships that we have with others, for if they are characterized by only superficial understanding, care, and empathy, then that dependence will limit rather than enable freedom.

Hunting for Freedom in Modern Life

PART 1:  FREEDOM OF ACTION

By Joseph

The modern era has seen developmental blooms in agriculture, science, technology, and industry, which together have yielded an inevitable blossoming of new and profound philosophical problems.  Thus, where in the past we may have struggled with disease and famine, we now face the more extreme issue of discord within and outside of the Self.  Modernity, the current age beginning in the nineteenth century, may be characterized by countless pressures on the individual to be a particular sort of person and act in a particular way.  These pressures are numerous in form and function, from genetic disposition to the capitalist drive to become the perfect new market, and all have the overall effect of diminishing individuality and freedom.  In short, the modern individual Self, as expressed by behavior, disposition, and attitude, closely mirrors the new world that we have built.  For example, the desire for an “easy street” life as maximization of the cost/benefit analysis is an embodiment of our capitalist economics.  Even the fact that we value freedom is socially constructed—freedom provides a sense of power, and the modern market-capitalist individual requires power in order to satisfy desire.

So, in a modern world, how might we conceive of freedom in a way that enables us to create a meaningful and coherent organization of the Self?  In this three-part series, I will attempt to both address the source of the conflicts that modernity applies to the Self and to provide suggestions of simple ways that the modern individual can thrive in this framework.  Throughout the analysis I will take freedom to be both the sense of and actual capacity for unrestrained exploration and development of a singular identity.  I would like to dissociate freedom from synonyms such as autonomy, disengagement, abandonment, and deliverance in favor of flexibility, liberty, opportunity, and self-determination.  I will also divide freedom into three types:  freedom of action, psychological freedom, and sociobiological freedom.  Although each type of freedom may exist without its partners, in order for an individual to achieve a full realization of freedom all three components must be fully integrated.  Unfortunately, the difficulties of modernity will make the achievement of this whole very rare.  In the end, this discussion will show that the incredible normalizing forces of modernity require a synthesis that utilizes a number of localities of freedom identified by several contemporary authors.  As in most philosophical discussions, a large and malleable gray area will be favored over the extremes of black or white in order locate a mode of freedom in contemporary life that is not nihilistic but allows for the modern individual to live a life ripe with vitality and meaning.

Freedom of action—the capacity to do whatever one likes whenever one likes and however one likes--is the first component in the trinity of freedom and will be the subject of this first part of the series.  At a basic level, the fact that the primary mode of punishment in modern times is imprisonment illustrates the value that we place on physical freedom.  By restricting the actions of those we punish we eliminate a critical component of their ability to develop a coherent and organized Self.  Better yet, we not only limit this development, but also are able to shape Self-development in a controlled matter, enabling the restructuring of individuals who have strayed from the accepted system of morality.  More than other types of freedom, a freedom of action is also the ultimate expression of power, a value that we hold because of our existence in a market/capitalist society.  According to the philosopher Ross Poole, one of the most important elements of a commercial society is “an individual propensity for self-interested behavior.”[1]  At first glance, it might appear that a requirement for the modern individual in an economic society to act primarily out of self-interest would allow for the utmost expression of personal freedom.  If I have to do what is of the most benefit to my personal existence, without concern for how my actions may affect others, than I truly have freedom to do whatever I like!  Unfortunately, such freedom is only an illusion.  First of all, Poole’s self-interested behavior is a limitation in itself.  If at all times we must be acting only out of self-interest, than the large portion of human action in which we are moving for others or for no reason at all is prohibited--spontaneity, and the feeling of freedom and vitality that comes with it, is out the window.  In addition, as Poole recognizes, the fulfillment of self-interest requires regulation.  If each self-interested individual were allowed complete freedom, eventually the interests of one individual will conflict with those of another:   “without some constraints on the operation of self-interest, the market would soon collapse into chaos,” necessitating the development and implication of an “effective legal framework.”1  Thus the illusion of freedom becomes critically important in a modern economic culture, by giving individuals the power to fulfill their desires.

According to another modern philosopher, Michel Foucault, the illusion of freedom is also a production of the systems of discipline that the modern individual is subject to.  Capitalist society spawns systems and institutions that in turn create individuals by which to perpetuate itself—individuals acting under a veil of false freedom:  “The perpetual penality that traverses all points and supervises every instant in the disciplinary institutions compares, differentiates, hierarchizes, homogenizes, excludes.  In short, it normalizes.”2  In addition, under Hannah Arendt’s conception of the Self, such normalization is necessary.  If we were to express personal freedom, as a component of an erotically vital moment for the Self, at all times, we would become entirely removed from the realm of ordinary life.  A person for whom such moments are a permanent state of transcendence would be unreachable and utterly boring.  Therefore we must spend the majority of our lives in a state of normalization and lack of freedom, to be punctuated by moments of vitality in which we can achieve meaning and life.  So if freedom of action in a market/capitalist society is ultimately an illusion, is there anywhere else where we may locate the freedom necessary for vitality?  At the beginning of this era, the market individual found his freedom in the private sphere.  While he fulfilled his market obligations for half of the day in the public sphere, he was able to return home at the end of the workday and achieve freedom and individuality in his actions and interactions with the family.  Unfortunately, two obstacles to this conception of freedom have arisen.  First, this split into two different realms is also necessarily a split in the Self.  Therefore, when the market individual returns home to the private sphere he turns off the normalized market/capitalist aspect of his Self for that which operates with his family.  Unfortunately then it is only one half of his Self that is ever free, and consequently his vitality and erotic engagement is never intact.  Second, as the yearning for the wealth and status (power) with which to fulfill desires grows the public sphere encroaches upon the private, eventually eliminating any private freedom and leaving only the socially constructed veil of freedom with which we began.

The search for freedom of action therefore has the potential to end up simply a cycle of torment.  However, hope can be found in two places:  first of all in individuals who have enough strength of will to manage themselves effectively in both the public and private spheres and possibly to pull their peers out of the quagmire, and second in next week’s topic—psychological freedom.