PART 2: PSYCHOLOGICAL FREEDOM
By Joseph
In last week’s issue we found a that without the careful control of a strong-willed Self, modernity may plunge the individual into failure in both the public and private spheres. Therefore, if capitalism and the market are only able to provide the illusion of freedom for the contemporary individual, perhaps we can locate a conception of actual freedom in a psychological exploration of the nature of the Self. For the philosopher Hannah Arendt, the psychological Self necessarily divides itself into two distinct parts, the I and the Me, for “thinking.” For Arendt, thinking is internal dialogue occurring within the mind, which necessarily includes tension within the self. The presence or absence of harmony during this self-split allows for both the creation of morality within the individual, and for freedom. From the start it is not clear that freedom actually exists during the self-split, for in the same way that the separation of distinct public and private spheres shuts out freedom through disruption of the self, might Arendt’s thinking split also result in a critical loss of integrity? On the other hand, what happens when we examine an individual who does not have a gap between the I and Me, thus lacking an internal dialogue? This individual is always firm in his convictions, never wavering, full of self-respect, and utterly boring. As the author Mark Helprin identified via one of his characters in the novel Winter’s Tale, “It’s the quick turns that mean you’re alive.”3 In short, what often gives us the greatest sense of vitality is not a static self-coherence, but a self that is constantly in flux through both dialogue within itself and by the incorporation and reshaping of external influences. Arendt also locates this sense of freedom in the split self: “Much more reliable will be the doubters and skeptics, not because skepticism is good or doubting wholesome, but because they are used to examine things and make up their own minds.”4 Whereas the capacity to examine is Arendt’s way of identifying the type of thinking that is important, the fact that doubters are able to “make up their own minds” illustrates the freedom that they gain from thinking. Without thinking we become subject not only to a stale morality built of our stolid convictions, we are also unable to take the external influences with which we are constantly bombarded and make them our own.
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| Image courtesy Miltblog.com |
In Arendt’s concept of thinking, they key to the notion of freedom is the self-development that thinking initiates. Arendt describes thinking as analogous to the story of Penelope: “thinking is like the veil of Penelope: it undoes every morning what it had finished the night before.”4 Whereas this process may be viewed as stagnating the development of the self, this view in fact misses the point of the breaking down—only by destroying all previous conceptions can we rebuild a psychological self that is bigger, better, and more free. The union of the two halves of the self achieves meaning in a moment of vitality, but in order to continue to achieve meaning in further moments of erotic vitality, the self must be unraveled again. In addition, the memory process strengthens the development of the self--each breakdown does not necessarily mean a loss of ground because in further inner-dialogue the self can draw upon the previous moments of vitality and use them to build yet another moment in which we find ourselves feeling most alive. In short, meanings are just one example of how thinking gives us the freedom to explore and develop, and as Nietzsche said, “if you have your why for life, you can get by with almost any how.” Thinking gives us freedom, freedom gives us meaning, and meaning in turn provides the freedom of action that we, as market/capitalists, desire.
Arendt’s thinking is only one function or aspect of the self. According to John Riker, another modern philosopher, it is not simply thinking but a well-organized and self-object related self that allows for vitality, and with this vitality, freedom. The only way to achieve complete individual singularity is to construct and know a strong self, for if an individual can be himself to his fullest potential, then he has the freedom to do anything. So first of all, a strong self must be constructed to contain ideals, ambitions, idiosyncratic traits, and most importantly, self-object relationships. The first three of these components are easier to understand and come more naturally, so instead I will use the bulk of this analysis to discuss self-object relationships. In addition, if a self-object relationship is to be understood as the presence of other individuals who can perform self-functions when the self is unable to5, might such dependence on others limit freedom? The short answer is yes and the long answer is no—for though a self-object relationship may indicate dependence superficially, it is important that not only does this conception of self-psychology entail a new conception of individuality, but also that dependence does not always result in a lack of freedom.
First of all, in Riker’s conception of self-psychology the self is not physically bound within the body of a particular individual, but incorporates the psyches of others as its self-objects. Therefore, if the self is conceived of as the representative portion of an individual, then the “boundaries” of an individual will extend beyond his physical limits. Without the presence of self-objects to carry out self-functions when the self lapses, the individual will fall into psychological abnormalities that will limit his freedom through a restricting pattern of pathological habits. Given this new notion of the singular person, freedom now must rely upon the restrictions placed upon the entire web of self-objects rather than his particular self. Second, dependence does not always result in a lack of freedom. It is only natural that we depend on others for psychological support, and it is modernity that has only recently replaced self-objects with value instead on the autonomy and self-sufficiency of an individual. Outwardly it might seem that in attempting to reconcile conceptions of freedom with the pressures of modernity this entire analysis praises extreme autonomy in an ultimate bow to the pressures of modernity. Rather, I am attempting a conceptualization of freedom in contemporary society that does not restrict the vitality and meaning of life. The self that functions best is that which is coherent and well-organized, and as normal life presents a number of psychological difficulties that are beyond the capacity of a single self to cope, the self-object interaction of others is necessary. Therefore by fulfilling lacking self-functions, self-objects create a coherent self, and a coherent self has the capacity for truly becoming and is therefore the paramount expression of freedom. An Aristotelian concept of the Self defines it as the substantive and critically acting “essence” of the object—to take a simple example, the essence of a knife is cutting, in that cutting is the act the knife performs that gives the knife substance. Although extending this analogy to something as complex as a human is tricky, the point is that for an intricate and conscious being like a human, managing all aspects of a substantive essence (the Self) can be difficult. In an increasingly complex modern world, we must make crutches out of our peers in order to shore up our increasingly complex and delicately balanced selves. What truly matters is the depth of the relationships that we have with others, for if they are characterized by only superficial understanding, care, and empathy, then that dependence will limit rather than enable freedom.
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