Hunting for Freedom in Modern Life

PART 3:  SOCIOBIOLOGICAL FREEDOM

By Joseph

In last week's article, we began to find some modern freedom in Self-psychology that finds support in and extends itself upon the psyches of others.  However, regardless of how we develop the self by thinking, solitude, and self-object relationships, we cannot ignore the influence that external social and biological forces have on freedom. 

Scientism—the modern belief in science as the source of all possible knowledge and the ultimate factor in determining identity and how we interact with the world—builds a world that is deterministic and devoid of all real freedom.  In scientism, each of our actions or thoughts has a root in a physical, chemical, or biological law that is applied universally.  Raised in a world that takes science to be the ultimate truth, and as a scientist myself, it is difficult to reject the possibility that scientific principles govern our behaviors just as they do the movements of heavenly bodies or the mating display of the speckled shrew. 

The application of scientism to freedom has been discussed previously in The Decathlete--have a look at an article written by Edward Missinne:  “Questioning Free Will.”  Not only do I see little reason to suppose that humans would not be subject to the laws that we apply to the rest of the natural world, but to do so would be to take on a dangerously anthrocentric view.  Such views have in the past justified the maltreatment of groups of people who, thought to be mere animals, had different biological and moral law applied to them.  Belief in the power of scientific knowledge such as genetics, biochemistry, and evolution does not exclude the possibility of freedom.  The point at which a belief in the power of science to achieve knowledge becomes incompatible with a truly free existence is scientism—when science is the only source of answers.  For example, as Tom Wolfe brings up in his book Hooking Up, the creation of “memes” by the renowned evolutionary advocate Richard Dawkins was Dawkins’ feeble attempt at a scientific explanation for a phenomenon outside of science:  “They don’t exist…memes are little people who sprinkle fairy dust on genes to enable them to pass along so-called cultural information to succeeding generations in a proper Darwinian way.”6  Thus, Dawkins fell into a typical fundamentalist trap—speculation, without evidence, molding unexplainable phenomena to an existing theory—and for someone who puts such weight on science and its capabilities, this happened in an utterly un-scientific way.

The degree to which science has become the fundamental belief structure in modern society is emphasized by countless examples such as the fact that doctors will “give you two weeks to live,” illustrating our conception of medical science as having the power to give life.  If science is not the only source of forces that shape the creation and actions of the self, then freedom of Self is still possible.  Therefore I propose a conception of freedom that is partially deterministic in that while our genetics and biology certainly are important components that make us who and what we are, they are not the only influence.  Social circumstances, particular experiences, and the behavior of the public and private spheres in our lives (to name only several examples) all exert their particular influences on self-development.  Self-development is also a process that continues unrestrained throughout life, such that who we are one moment is different in the next, depending, of course, upon the significance of the events themselves. 

In addition, we do not take such influences as static objects.  It is our subjectivity itself that enables us to respond to such influences in a way that will be new and different from the way that anyone else has responded.  Countless studies of identical twins, separated at birth, show that despite the influence of identical genetics, these individuals are able to mold the other influences in their lives and thus become entirely different people.  Scientism as a comprehensive worldview was created as a subconscious response to freedom itself, for an entirely indeterminate world is terrifying.  With so much left up to the whims of man or God, man’s need for freedom was threatened, yet the response overshot the mark and again infringed upon liberty.

By the theories of the renown biologist Edward O. Wilson, heredity cannot be the sole influence on the creation and action of the human self.  The second component of a sociobiological theory necessarily includes the social forces that manipulate the self, what Riker and Foucault call the “social unconscious.”  According to Foucault, individuals are entirely the production of social pressures that serve to discipline our bodies (and Foucault’s “body” includes the mind as well).  As our entire lives have occurred in a system characterized by social pressures, we have no way of knowing who or what we are outside of the social context.  Unfortunately, Foucault does not recognize the multitude of other forces (e.g. genetics) that possibly exert influences on our selves.  If social forces were the only determinate force dictating the development of the self, then a deficiency in any of the other hypothesized sources of self-development, such as love, would have no consequences.  Yet psychological studies show countless examples of individuals with pathologically fragmented selves resulting from a profound lack in love, empathy, or idiosyncratic traits, as well as social exposure.  Such patients suffer a profound loss of freedom, as their deprivation of the necessary developmental forces results in an inability to freely enrich the self. 

Even within Foucault’s model of complete social control, freedom is still possible.  In fact, the social unconscious is yet another necessary influence, the lack of which results in a lopsided self.  It is in fact the limitation of spontaneity itself that allows for an infinite expansion of the self’s potential.  According to Riker, spontaneity is necessarily limited and therefore can only become repetitive7—only by building upon and expanding a disciplined pattern can we achieve true development and meaning.  Rules, especially the “docility” of our bodies, are not restrictive but build our potential, enable us to know our potential, and then explore its limitless uses.  In short, discipline gives us the power to explore and develop the self:  “In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth.  The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production.”2  Thus Foucault has identified an answer for one of the largest questions in self-psychology: how might we come to know our unconscious self?  Although systems of the social unconscious may also serve to normalize and dominate the body, they give the individual the power to gain knowledge of himself.  Achieving a means of knowing and understanding the self enables an inner dialogue that moves beyond even Arendt’s “thinking” as the first step to freely developing the self.  After all, how can you enrich, refine, and realize what you do not know or understand?

Therefore, for both the social conscious and biological influences, the project becomes how to use and manipulate these forces for self-development.  Given the multitude of modern forces exerting pressure upon the self, even beyond the sociobiological, I see these influences less as pressures and more as their own fragments of the self.  When Arendt supposes that in thinking the Self splits into two parts that then are able to enter into an internal dialogue, she is ignoring a number of other voices that subconsciously take part in the conversation.  Therefore, rather than a bilateral divide, the Self splits into innumerable factions, which each have their respective influences on the discourse that will result in action or thought of the individual.  In the end, it is still the “I” and “me” portions of the self that have the final say in the inner dialogue, but it is by these two voices that the self incorporates and manipulates the internal factions representing external pressures freely (paradoxical, I know).

Given each of the sources of freedom in modernity that I have discussed throughout this analysis, we need a synthesis by which we can actively pursue the freedom that we desire.  I began with the assertion that in a capitalist market society, what is most important is the maintenance of a veil of false freedom that enables the pursuit of our desires despite the normalizing forces of modernity.  I also found that although actual freedom used to be located in the private sphere, this freedom has now been displaced by the ever-growing needs of the market world.  Given the lack of true freedom of action apparent in a capitalist society, I then searched rather for an internal freedom of the will in Arendt’s concept of self-splits.  Arendt’s “thinking” enables us to take the external pressures of modernity, make them our own, and use them for our own development of the self.  By this process, thinking enables meaning and meaning enables freedom.  Moving from Arendt to self-psychology, I found that it is not just thinking but also a well-organized self that allows for vitality and therefore freedom.  In addition, contrary to superficial appearances self-objects can be a source of freedom, and self psychology necessitates a new conception of the individual that includes a web of fluctuating self-object others.  Moving beyond the conceptions of the self put forth by Arendt and Riker, I found that sociobiological factors, though they appear to restrict freedom, must be incorporated as key subconscious components of the inner dialogue that creates freedom.  However, it is still the I and Me split that incorporates and manipulates the multitude of external voices that enter the dialogue.  In the end, as a capitalist/market culture provides no room for physical freedom of action, we locate the source of the freedom that we require to develop meaning in the psyche.  Conceptions of freedom as located in power, self-development, and the inner self appear to be the most dependable source of meaning to oppose the relentless forces of modernity.

Hunting for Freedom in Modern Life

PART 2:  PSYCHOLOGICAL FREEDOM

By Joseph

In last week’s issue we found a that without the careful control of a strong-willed Self, modernity may plunge the individual into failure in both the public and private spheres.  Therefore, if capitalism and the market are only able to provide the illusion of freedom for the contemporary individual, perhaps we can locate a conception of actual freedom in a psychological exploration of the nature of the Self.  For the philosopher Hannah Arendt, the psychological Self necessarily divides itself into two distinct parts, the I and the Me, for “thinking.”  For Arendt, thinking is internal dialogue occurring within the mind, which necessarily includes tension within the self.  The presence or absence of harmony during this self-split allows for both the creation of morality within the individual, and for freedom.  From the start it is not clear that freedom actually exists during the self-split, for in the same way that the separation of distinct public and private spheres shuts out freedom through disruption of the self, might Arendt’s thinking split also result in a critical loss of integrity?  On the other hand, what happens when we examine an individual who does not have a gap between the I and Me, thus lacking an internal dialogue?  This individual is always firm in his convictions, never wavering, full of self-respect, and utterly boring.  As the author Mark Helprin identified via one of his characters in the novel Winter’s Tale, “It’s the quick turns that mean you’re alive.”3  In short, what often gives us the greatest sense of vitality is not a static self-coherence, but a self that is constantly in flux through both dialogue within itself and by the incorporation and reshaping of external influences.  Arendt also locates this sense of freedom in the split self:  “Much more reliable will be the doubters and skeptics, not because skepticism is good or doubting wholesome, but because they are used to examine things and make up their own minds.”4  Whereas the capacity to examine is Arendt’s way of identifying the type of thinking that is important, the fact that doubters are able to “make up their own minds” illustrates the freedom that they gain from thinking.  Without thinking we become subject not only to a stale morality built of our stolid convictions, we are also unable to take the external influences with which we are constantly bombarded and make them our own.

Image courtesy Miltblog.com

In Arendt’s concept of thinking, they key to the notion of freedom is the self-development that thinking initiates.  Arendt describes thinking as analogous to the story of Penelope:  “thinking is like the veil of Penelope:  it undoes every morning what it had finished the night before.”4  Whereas this process may be viewed as stagnating the development of the self, this view in fact misses the point of the breaking down—only by destroying all previous conceptions can we rebuild a psychological self that is bigger, better, and more free.  The union of the two halves of the self achieves meaning in a moment of vitality, but in order to continue to achieve meaning in further moments of erotic vitality, the self must be unraveled again.  In addition, the memory process strengthens the development of the self--each breakdown does not necessarily mean a loss of ground because in further inner-dialogue the self can draw upon the previous moments of vitality and use them to build yet another moment in which we find ourselves feeling most alive.  In short, meanings are just one example of how thinking gives us the freedom to explore and develop, and as Nietzsche said, “if you have your why for life, you can get by with almost any how.”  Thinking gives us freedom, freedom gives us meaning, and meaning in turn provides the freedom of action that we, as market/capitalists, desire.

Arendt’s thinking is only one function or aspect of the self.  According to John Riker, another modern philosopher, it is not simply thinking but a well-organized and self-object related self that allows for vitality, and with this vitality, freedom.  The only way to achieve complete individual singularity is to construct and know a strong self, for if an individual can be himself to his fullest potential, then he has the freedom to do anything.  So first of all, a strong self must be constructed to contain ideals, ambitions, idiosyncratic traits, and most importantly, self-object relationships.  The first three of these components are easier to understand and come more naturally, so instead I will use the bulk of this analysis to discuss self-object relationships.  In addition, if a self-object relationship is to be understood as the presence of other individuals who can perform self-functions when the self is unable to5, might such dependence on others limit freedom?  The short answer is yes and the long answer is no—for though a self-object relationship may indicate dependence superficially, it is important that not only does this conception of self-psychology entail a new conception of individuality, but also that dependence does not always result in a lack of freedom. 

First of all, in Riker’s conception of self-psychology the self is not physically bound within the body of a particular individual, but incorporates the psyches of others as its self-objects.  Therefore, if the self is conceived of as the representative portion of an individual, then the “boundaries” of an individual will extend beyond his physical limits.  Without the presence of self-objects to carry out self-functions when the self lapses, the individual will fall into psychological abnormalities that will limit his freedom through a restricting pattern of pathological habits.  Given this new notion of the singular person, freedom now must rely upon the restrictions placed upon the entire web of self-objects rather than his particular self.  Second, dependence does not always result in a lack of freedom.  It is only natural that we depend on others for psychological support, and it is modernity that has only recently replaced self-objects with value instead on the autonomy and self-sufficiency of an individual.  Outwardly it might seem that in attempting to reconcile conceptions of freedom with the pressures of modernity this entire analysis praises extreme autonomy in an ultimate bow to the pressures of modernity.  Rather, I am attempting a conceptualization of freedom in contemporary society that does not restrict the vitality and meaning of life.  The self that functions best is that which is coherent and well-organized, and as normal life presents a number of psychological difficulties that are beyond the capacity of a single self to cope, the self-object interaction of others is necessary.  Therefore by fulfilling lacking self-functions, self-objects create a coherent self, and a coherent self has the capacity for truly becoming and is therefore the paramount expression of freedom.  An Aristotelian concept of the Self defines it as the substantive and critically acting “essence” of the object—to take a simple example, the essence of a knife is cutting, in that cutting is the act the knife performs that gives the knife substance.  Although extending this analogy to something as complex as a human is tricky, the point is that for an intricate and conscious being like a human, managing all aspects of a substantive essence (the Self) can be difficult.  In an increasingly complex modern world, we must make crutches out of our peers in order to shore up our increasingly complex and delicately balanced selves.  What truly matters is the depth of the relationships that we have with others, for if they are characterized by only superficial understanding, care, and empathy, then that dependence will limit rather than enable freedom.